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FROM “JUST” TO “JUST DECENT”? CONSTITUTIONAL
TRANSFORMATIONS AND THE REORDERING OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY PUBLIC SPHERE
CINDY SKACH*
Het kabinet vindt het namelijk onwenselijk dat gezichtsbedekkende kleding—waaronder de boerka—wordt
gedragen in de openbare ruimte uit overwegingen van
openbare order, veiligheid en berscherming van (mede)
burgers.1
The cabinet finds it, namely, undesirable, that face-covering
garments—including the burqa—would be worn in the public sphere, based on considerations of public order, security
and the protection of (fellow) citizens.
Je tâcherai d’allier toujours dans cette recherche ce que le
droit permet avec ce que l’intérêt prescrit, afin que la justice
et l’utilité ne se trouvent point divisées.2
I will try throughout this inquiry to bring together that which
law permits with that which interest requires, so that justice
and utility are in no way divided.
On November 17, 2006, the Dutch cabinet backed a proposal,
introduced by the Dutch Minister for Integration and Immigration, to
ban citizens from wearing “face-covering garments—including the
burqa—in the public sphere [openbare ruimte].”3 The reasons cited for
Copyright  2007 by Cindy Skach.
* Associate Professor of Government, Harvard University, and Affiliated Professor of
International Legal Studies, Harvard Law School.
1. For an English translation of Algemeen verbod gezichtsbedekkende kleding, the
Dutch Ministry of Justice, see General Ban on Garments Covering the Face, Press Release,
November 17, 2006, http://english.justitie.nl/currenttopics/pressreleases/archives2006/
General-ban-on-garments-covering-the-face.aspx. All translations herein, unless otherwise
noted, are my own. This Essay is drawn from my forthcoming book, The Constitution of
Peoples. For helpful discussions I am grateful to Jack Balkin, Francesca Bignami, Jon Elster,
Sandy Levinson, Jonathan Pratter, Larry Solum, Mark Tushnet, members of the Constitutional Studies Luncheon at the University of Texas Law School, members of the Colloquium on Constitutional Law and Theory at Georgetown Law, and members of the 2006
Maryland Constitutional Law Schmooze. Any errors, of course, remain my own.
2. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DU CONTRAT SOCIAL 103 (Clarendon Press 1972) (1762);
JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 13 (1999).
3. See supra note 1.
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this ban by the Dutch Ministry of Justice were “considerations of public order, security and the protection of fellow citizens.”4 To American ears, such a justification certainly seems to be at odds with the
concept of freedom. We recall that in 2003, for example, Assistant
Attorney General Alexander Acosta intervened on behalf of an elevenyear-old Muslim girl who had been sent home from an Oklahoma
public school for wearing an Islamic headscarf. Invoking the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits states
from applying dress codes in an inconsistent and discriminatory manner, Acosta ordered the school to allow the girl to attend class with
her head veiled, emphasizing that “[r]eligious discrimination has no
place in American schools.”5
But across the European continent, things are different, and this
recent move by the Dutch government is not unique. This particular
government proposal follows in the footsteps of several recent attempts across Europe, most recently in France and Germany, to legislate, and adjudicate, the rights of religious citizens. Such attempts
have almost always been disproportionate, in that they originate with,
and mainly affect, practicing female Muslims. Indeed, one of the
most important global constitutional challenges in the twenty-first
century will be religious diversity and the problems it presents for constitutions constructed in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century social
contexts. And this latest legal initiative in the Netherlands is particularly noteworthy; whereas previous attempts to limit the wearing of
religious symbols in public concerned public schools (that specific,
civic subsphere of the public sphere that claims responsibility for citizen formation), the recent Dutch proposal aims at removing religious
symbols from the entire public sphere.6
These developments in the member states of the European
Union, taken together, demonstrate a rapidly growing trend in European jurisprudence. And seen as a trend, these developments raise
critical questions about the possibility, and limits, of liberty in increasingly diverse polities within the European Union and beyond.7 These
developments also offer proof of an increasing, and perhaps impossible, tension between, on the one hand, a “coming world order” that
4. See supra note 1.
5. US Opposes Oklahoma Headscarf Ban, BBC News, Mar. 31, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/americas/3585377.stm.
6. I use here the understanding of public sphere found in the works of Habermas.
Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, in UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZU EINER KATEGORIE
DER BÜRGERLICHEN GESELLSCHAFT (Neuwied: H. Luchterhand ed., MIT Press 1989) (1962).
7. Portions of this section draw on Cindy Skach, International Decisions: Şahin v. Turkey; “Teacher Headscarf” Case, 100 AM. J. INT’L LAW 186, 186–196 (2006).
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aims at the “cultural extension and legal enforcement of human
rights,” including freedom of religion and belief,8 and, on the other
hand, an increased vigilance of certain religious practices that are
considered indicative of a “clash of civilizations.”9 This tension in Europe is now most often dealt with through prohibition: legal restrictions on religious freedom, defended in many countries by
constitutional and administrative courts, all in the name of a most illusive and yet powerful European constitutional principle: public
order.10
My argument in this Essay is threefold. First, I illustrate this trend
in European jurisprudence in member and candidate states of the European Union, showing that it is indeed a trend, and suggesting that it
originated from within legal, and not political, society: with judges,
not legislatures, and via a changing legal discourse of rights. Second,
I excavate the principle of “public order,” which first appeared in Roman law, and I distinguish it from its American counterpart, noting its
inclusion in European constitutional law and its redefinition over
time. Third, I ask, does this matter? In answer, I argue that indeed it
does, that this tension between fundamental freedoms and public order (redefined, broadened, and linked by judges to questions of international security), and the manner in which it is being adjudicated
across Europe, constitute a slippage, by way of constitutional law, away
from liberal constitutional democracy.11 Such slippage takes place, as
I begin to show here, through the return to an “originalist” interpretation of the European constitutional principle of public order. As
such, I argue, these cases demonstrate the growth of a pan-European
legal discourse of religious symbols not only as text, but as a mechanism, however broad and ambiguous, of social control. The larger
implication of these developments for constitutional theory, I argue, is
that by forcibly removing Islamic religious symbols from the public
sphere (or subsets thereof), states are forcing a Rawlsian thick veil of
ignorance on these complex societies, in the name of liberalism, but
with paradoxical and detrimental effects for the practice of liberal constitutional democracy.12 What I show here is that by delegitimizing
8. WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 157 (2005).
9. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD
ORDER 28–29 (1996).
10. For more information on the clash of civilization theory, see id.
11. The more systematic argument and evidence is found in CINDY SKACH, THE CONSTITUTION OF PEOPLES (forthcoming).
12. Here I will not enter the communitarianism versus liberalism debates, but rather,
will simply state that my assumptions concerning the possibility and limits of a thickly
veiled original position are closer to those of Sandel than those of Rawls. See generally
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religious symbols through legal prohibition, particularly in the public
sphere, and in the name of forging a thick veil of ignorance as a basis
for consensus, these states risk artificially veiling the multiple comprehensive doctrines within their now immigrant societies. In so doing,
these states threaten not only the (albeit fragile) overlapping consensus that had been achieved, but they also risk provoking a legitimacy
crisis of the legal order itself. For Habermas’s claim was prudent, in
that “[l]egal procedures thus stand to lose the force to found legitimacy if notions of a substantial ethical life slowly creep into the interpretation and practice of formal requirements.”13
In order to suggest, here, the transformations of the European
public sphere by way of legal prohibition, I draw on Rawlsian categories that allow for a clean conceptual and analytical starting point.14
These categories include the liberal constitutional democratic society
and the less liberal but decent hierarchical regime.15 The key difference in these regimes or societies, for my purposes here, lies in
Rawls’s distinction between the two with respect to liberty of conscience. As he notes, in the decent hierarchical society, as with the
liberal constitutional democratic society, a right to liberty that includes sufficient liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion
and thought is necessary. But in the case of the decent hierarchical
society,
this liberty of conscience may not be as extensive nor as
equal for all members of society: for instance, one religion
may legally predominate in the state government, while
other religions, though tolerated, may be denied the right to
hold certain positions. I refer to this kind of situation as permitting “liberty of conscience, though not an equal
liberty.”16
Consider in this context Rawls’s condition (iv) for a just constitutional democracy to exist as a reasonable utopia. He specifies that,
RAWLS, supra note 2; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
Moreover, I stress that my use of “veil of ignorance” is in no way meant to be metaphorical.
13. Jürgen Habermas, Religious Tolerance—The Pacemaker for Cultural Rights, 79 PHIL. 5,
14 (2004).
14. See generally RAWLS, supra note 2. I am adapting Rawls’s normative, static categories
for the purposes of empirical classification and to understand dynamic movement between
them. I acknowledge that Rawls’s categories each have numerous defining characteristics,
which I will neither enumerate nor utilize here, as I will be concerning myself only with the
dimension related to religious freedom. I admit and accept all the normal caveats of such
conversion.
15. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 59–70.
16. Id. at 65 n.2 (emphasis added).
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[b]ecause of the fact of reasonable pluralism, constitutional
democracy must have political and social institutions that effectively lead its citizens to acquire the appropriate sense of
justice as they grow up and take part in society. . . . Insofar as
liberal conceptions require virtuous conduct of citizens, the
necessary (political) virtues are those of political cooperation, such as a sense of fairness and tolerance and a willingness to meet others half way.17
A crucial challenge for any liberal constitutional democracy then,
not just those of Europe, is to balance between the neutrality of the
state with respect to the various faiths and beliefs held by citizens
within its borders, in the name of tolerance, and the protection of
individual freedom of conscience. These are two inseparable aspects
of religious freedom, but we should also see them as potentially conflicting imperatives of the same fundamental right.18 This is true, for
example, of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. At various points in U.S. history, the Supreme Court has dealt with conflicting imperatives within
this fundamental right by adopting either a weak or strong interpretation of each imperative, with shifts in jurisprudence changing over
time.19 European constitutional guarantees of religious freedom are
similar, and religious freedom (≈ free expression) and state neutrality
(≈ establishment) are both protected by the constitutions of the member states of the Union, and by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. For example,
in France, the Law on the Separation of Church and State of 1905,
which guides the republican constitutional principle of laı̈cité, demands that the state allow for religious freedom, but also requires that
the state not interfere with, or privilege, any one religion over any
other. The language of the law also demands that the state not ignore
any religion, and cautions that it is neither necessary, nor desirable, to
remove religion from public life, or to strictly separate civil society
from religious society.20
17. Id. at 15.
18. Sociologist Reinhard Bendix first drew our attention to concepts that have inherently conflicting imperatives. My point here is that constitutional principles, among them
fundamental freedoms, often have inherently conflicting imperatives and, interestingly,
are adjudicated as such. For a discussion of Bendix’s work, see Andrew C. Gould, Conflicting Imperatives and Concept Formation, 61 REV. OF POL. 439 (1999).
19. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION 31–72 (2004); KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 5 (2005).
20. Law on the Separation of Churches and the State of Dec. 9, 1905, Journal Officiel
de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Dec. 11, 1905, p.7205. See
also THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 139 (Andrew West et al. eds., 2nd ed. 1998).
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However, across the European continent, a third, critical principle makes the European experience somewhat distinct from that of
American democracy. This is the constitutional and administrativelegal principle of public order. Inspired by Roman law, and providing
the basis for many civil law systems across the European continent,
ordre public was first crafted into the Code Napoléon. Importantly, this
legal concept, reflecting the rather authoritarian visions that its architect, Portalis, held with respect to the relationship between a state and
its citizens, was originally used as an instrument for orienting social
activity, and defending the fundamental values of the state.21 As such,
in the European legal context, historically, “public order sits in dialectic opposition to individual public freedoms, and especially those of
freedom of movement, the inviolability of the home, freedom of conscience and freedom of expression.”22 Even the language of the
French civil code echoes this original meaning, associating public order with the moral standards of the state.23 The experience of World
War II nudged this dialectic to favor individual freedoms. As a reaction to the “Third Reich” and its atrocities, postwar European constitutions and constitutional jurisprudence privileged the principle of
human dignity (entrenched in several postwar constitutions), and in
the case of some states including Germany, made institutional space
for a strong constitutional court that stood outside of the judiciary
and defended individual freedoms. For most of the postwar European period, from the perspective of individual freedoms such as freedom of religion, most states on the continent were, in theory and in
practice, close to being liberal democratic constitutional societies.
Writing now in 2007, in light of recent legislation and the adjudication of the rights of religious citizens across the continent within the
past few years, one can no longer claim this as true. So what do we
make of it? The bulk of this Essay attempts to show that, quite problematically for democratic practice, this change across the continent
begins to constitute a slippage away from the postwar starting point of
liberal democratic constitutional regimes in several of the member
states of the European Union, a slippage that will be difficult (if not
impossible) to reverse. I also suggest herein that, problematically for
constitutional theory, such slippage was made possible through,
21. DICTIONNAIRE DE LA CULTURE JURIDIQUE (Denis Alland & Stephanie Rials eds.,
2003).
22. LEXIQUE DES TERMES JURIDIQUES (Raymond Guillien et al. eds., 1999).
23. In the French Civil Code it currently appears in Article 6: “Art. 6—One may not
derogate by private agreements from laws which involve public policy and morality.” THE
FRENCH CIVIL CODE 2 (John H. Crabb trans., rev. ed. 1995).
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rather than against, constitutional principles. That is, I show that this
slippage results from changes in the delicate balance between the European equivalents of free exercise and establishment clauses,
changes that come as a result of a European reframing of the critical
legal concept of public order. See Figure 1.24
FIGURE I: THE CONFLICTING IMPERATIVES
PRINCIPLES
Strong
Interpretation

OF

CONSTITUTIONAL

Movement along the line
driven by reinterpretations of
“public order”

FREEDOM OF
RELIGION

Weak
Interpretation

STATE
NEUTRALITY

Strong
Interpretation

Two recent court cases, in which the reasoning of the judges and
justices in both the majority and dissenting opinions is indicative of
this constitutional slippage, escaped attention in the United States.
These are the case of Şahin v. Turkey,25 in which the European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR) permitted the state to regulate the wearing
of headscarves, and the Teacher Headscarf case,26 in which the German
Constitutional Court rejected such regulation (at least on the particu24. My neutrality dimension here conflates various aspects of neutrality for the purposes of illustration. Actual neutrality, its various discourses within law and its practice, are
of course much more complex than I depict here, and the nuance gets more systematic
treatment in my book, CINDY SKACH, THE CONSTITUTION OF PEOPLES (forthcoming).
25. Şahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99 (2005) (Court report),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int [hereinafter Şahin II].
26. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 24, 2003,
2 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerwGE] 1 (F.R.G.), available at
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20030924_2bvr143602en.html [hereinafter
Teacher Headscarf Case].
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lar facts of the case). The events leading to the judgment in Şahin v.
Turkey began on August 26, 1997, when Şahin, a twenty-four-year-old
woman, then in her fifth year of studies in the Faculty of Medicine at
the University of Bursa, Turkey, enrolled in the Cerrahpasa Faculty of
Medicine at the University of Istanbul.27 According to Şahin, she had
been wearing an Islamic headscarf during her first four years at the
University of Bursa, and then continued to wear the headscarf at the
University of Istanbul until February 1998.28 On February 23, the vicechancellor of the University of Istanbul issued an official statement (a
“circular”) declaring that
[b]y virtue of the Constitution, the law and regulations, and
in accordance with the case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court and the European Commission of Human Rights
and the resolutions adopted by the university administrative
boards, students whose “heads are covered” (who wear the
Islamic headscarf) and students (including overseas students) with beards must not be admitted to lectures, courses
or tutorials.29
Accordingly, on March 12, Şahin, wearing the Islamic headscarf,
was denied entrance to a written university exam.30 On March 20, and
again on April 16 and June 10, she was refused entrance into lectures
and examinations.31 The Dean of the faculty then issued a warning to
Şahin, stating that her attitude and failure to comply with the dress
code were not befitting of a student.32 On July 21, Şahin filed an application with the European Commission for Human Rights under
former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.33 She alleged that a ban on the
Islamic headscarf in higher education institutions violated her rights
and freedoms under Articles 8 (right to privacy), 9 (freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion), 10 (freedom of expression), and
14 (freedom from discrimination) of the Convention, and Article 2 of
its Protocol No. 1 (right to education).34
27. Şahin II, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 106.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 107.
33. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Council of Europe, Sept. 21, 1970, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/
Treaties/Html/005.htm.
34. Şahin II, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 99.
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On July 29, Şahin requested in writing an exception to the vicechancellor’s circular.35 She claimed that the circular and its implementation by the university infringed her rights as guaranteed by Articles 8, 9, and 14 of the Convention, and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1,
and that the university had no regulatory power in this sphere.36 On
February 26, 1999, eleven days after an unauthorized assembly protested the dress code outside the dean’s office at the Faculty of
Medicine, the Dean began disciplinary proceedings against various
students, including Şahin.37 On March 19, the Istanbul Administrative Court dismissed her application to suspend the circular and held
instead that section 13(b) of Law No. 2547, the Higher Education Act,
gave university chancellors power to regulate students’ dress for the
purposes of “maintaining order.”38 Şahin appealed. On April 13, the
Dean suspended the applicant for one semester, citing Article 9(j) of
the Students Disciplinary Procedure Rules.39 On June 10, Şahin filed
an application with the Istanbul Administrative Court for an order reversing her suspension.40 On September 16, she enrolled in the University of Vienna.41 The Istanbul Administrative Court dismissed her
application on November 30, holding that “in the light of the material
in the case file and the settled case law on the subject, the impugned
measure could not be regarded as illegal.”42 The applicant appealed.
On June 28, 2000, Turkish Law No. 4584 came into force, affording students an amnesty for disciplinary offenses, and annulling all
penalties.43 In light of the amnesty legislation, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled it unnecessary to examine Şahin’s appeal against
the judgment of November 30, 1999.44 Consequently, on April 19,
2001, that court dismissed her appeal of the November 30 decision of
the Istanbul Administrative Court.45
In its decision of June 29, 2004, regarding Şahin’s application of
July 1998, a seven-judge chamber of the ECHR held unanimously that
there had been no violation of Şahin’s freedom of thought, conscience, and religion under Convention Article 9, and that there was
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 106.
at 107.
at 106–07.
at 107.
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no separate question arising from that Article in conjunction with Articles 8, 10, or 14, or Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.46 Moreover, the
Court explicitly stated that “the University of Istanbul’s regulations imposing restrictions on the wearing of Islamic headscarves and the measures taken to implement them were justified in principle and
proportionate to the aims pursued and, therefore, could be regarded
as ‘necessary in a democratic society.’”47 In reaching its decision, the
Court drew on the Constitution of Turkey and on legal practice concerning Turkey’s development as a secular (laik) state, as well as on
the case law of Turkey’s Constitutional Court.48 Importantly, the
ECHR also drew on comparative law that included court decisions and
legal debates concerning the Islamic headscarf and state education in
Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom.49 In its decisions, the ECHR explicitly quoted the
French National Assembly’s bill of February 2004, which banned “visible” religious symbols in state primary and secondary schools.50 The
ECHR also cited the decision of the German Constitutional Court in
the Teacher Headscarf case of September 24, 2003, discussed below, as
an example of a legal position that seemed to run counter to that of
other member states of the European Union.51
On September 27, 2004, the applicant requested that the case be
referred to the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights, pursuant to Convention Article 43.52 On November 10, the
Grand Chamber agreed to hear the case and, exactly one year later, a
seventeen-judge panel handed down a lengthy decision, which included one separate, concurring opinion of two judges (Rozakis and
Vajic) and one dissenting opinion (Tulkens).53 The majority decision
held that there was no violation of Article 9 of the Convention (16-1
vote), that there had been no violation of the first sentence of Article
2 of Protocol No. 1 (16-1), that there had been no violation of Article
8 of the Convention (unanimous), and that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention (unanimous).54 Relying substantially on the existing rules and regulations of various organs of the
46. Şahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 109, 109–110 (2004) (Court
report), available at http://www.echr.coe.int [hereinafter Şahin I].
47. Id. at 134.
48. Id. at 118–19.
49. Id. at 122–23.
50. Id. at 123.
51. Id.
52. Şahin II, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 119.
53. Id. at 99, 138.
54. Id. at 99–100.
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Turkish state, along with the case law of the Turkish Constitutional
Court, the Grand Chamber stated that “[b]y reason of their direct and
continuous contact with the education community, the university authorities are in principle better placed than an international court to
evaluate local needs and conditions or the requirements of a particular course.”55 It went on to note that “[i]n the light of the foregoing
and having regard to the contracting states’ margin of appreciation in
this sphere, the Court finds that the interference in issue was justified
in principle and proportionate to the aim pursued[,]” and the court
found no breach of Article 9 of the Convention.56
The events leading to the judgment in what is known as the
Teacher Headscarf case in Germany began when Fereshta Ludin, a
twenty-six-year-old German school teacher of Muslim faith, was turned
down for a teaching position in the Baden-Württemberg school system
because, it was said, the Islamic headscarf she wore in the classroom
was incompatible with the principle of separation of church and state
in the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz).57 Ludin was born in Kabul,
Afghanistan in 1972, moved to Germany in 1987, and became a German citizen in 1995.58 After having passed the First State Examination
(required of all teachers in Germany), and after having completed a
required apprenticeship, Ludin passed the Second State Examination
for teachers of primary and secondary schools.59
In July 1998, the state of Baden-Württemberg’s board of education declined Ludin’s application for employment as a teacher in primary and secondary schools in the state of Baden-Württemberg on
grounds of her “lack of personal aptitude[ ]” for the teaching profession.60 According to the board of education’s office in Stuttgart,
Ludin showed no interest in removing her headscarf while teaching
classes.61 From the board of education’s point of view, this refusal was
problematic because the board believed that the Islamic headscarf
had a “signaling effect” (Signalwirkung), which it considered incompatible with the principle of state neutrality (staatlichen Neutralitätsgebot).62 The board feared that the wearing of headscarves by
teachers of Baden-Württemberg’s primary and secondary schools
55. Id. at 130.
56. Id.
57. Teacher Headscarf Case, paras. 2–3.
58. Id. para. 2.
59. Id.
60. Id. paras. 3, 6.
61. See id. para. 12 (stating that the court made the teaching position dependant on
Ludin’s readiness to teach without her headscarf).
62. Id. para. 3.
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would not only force impressionable young students to confront Islam, but, more importantly, undermine the objective of integration,
notably of Muslim girls.63 In this context, the board considered the
headscarf to be an expression of cultural demarcation and therefore a
political, as well as a religious, symbol.64
Ludin appealed this decision through three levels of the German
administrative courts: from the administrative trial court (Verwaltungsgericht) of Stuttgart (decision of March 24, 2000), to the administrative appeals court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) of Baden-Württemberg
(June 26, 2001), to the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) (July 4, 2002), the highest court of appeal for administrative law in Germany.65 The Federal Administrative Court upheld
the board of education’s denial of employment to Ludin and ruled
that teachers in public schools must refrain from openly displaying
religious symbols in class.66 It reasoned that public school teachers
are representatives of the state and must serve as role models for
students.67
Having exhausted all possible lines of appeal in the German administrative court system, Ludin launched a “constitutional complaint” (Verfassungsbeschwerde) with Germany’s Federal Constitutional
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht).68 Her complaint alleged that her
basic right of religious freedom, as enshrined in the German Basic
Law Article 4, had been violated.69 Specifically, Ludin maintained
that her wearing of the headscarf was a characteristic of her personality and an expression of her internal religious beliefs. She therefore
claimed a violation of her rights under the German Basic Law Articles
1(1) (human dignity), 2(1) (personal freedoms), 3(1) and (3) (equality before the law), 4(1) and (2) (freedom of faith, conscience, and
creed), and 33(2) and (3) (equal citizenship and equal access to civil
service employment).70
Ludin’s attorney before the Constitutional Court, Hansjörg
Melchinger, maintained that Ludin’s right to act in accordance with
her beliefs should be protected, and he cautioned that the Islamic
headscarf should not be in itself equated with Islamic fundamental63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

para. 5.
para. 3.
para. 1 (ruling).
para. 12 (opinion).
para. 13.
para. 1.
paras. 16, 25.
para. 16.
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ism.71 He also argued that the scarf’s so-called signaling effect was less
significant than had been stated by the board of education, noting, in
particular, that “it is not about what a teacher has on the head, but
rather, what she has in her head.”72
Arguing the case for Baden-Württemberg, Ferdinand Kirchhof, a
law professor at the University of Tübingen, maintained that regardless of Ludin’s motive for wearing the scarf, the symbolic meaning and
signaling effect of the Islamic scarf itself were the state’s principal
sources of concern.73 Invoking the state neutrality principle in German constitutional law, Kirchhof went on to argue that increased immigration in Germany obligates the state to be vigilant with respect to
all religious matters, and particularly with respect to school children—who, he claimed, learn through imitation and are, when entering primary and secondary schools, at a critical stage of
development.74
On September 24, 2003, the Constitutional Court overturned the
Federal Administrative Court’s decision and upheld Ludin’s right to
wear a headscarf in the classroom.75 The Constitutional Court’s rationale, supported by five of the eight justices in its second chamber, was
that in the absence of any clear, unambiguous regulations in the German states concerning the wearing of religious symbols in the classroom, the states could not legally ban qualified teachers, such as
Ludin, from holding this public office.76 At the same time, the majority noted that, given the increased religious pluralism in German society, there may indeed be a “greater potential for possible conflicts in
schools.”77 Therefore, the majority concluded, there may be both
good reasons for a stricter interpretation of the neutrality principle
when it comes to schools and, in particular, a need for rules governing
the “outward appearance” (äußeres Auftreten) of instructors.78 The majority stressed, however, that decisions regarding which particular rules
should be enacted in order to keep “religious peace” (religiösen
Frieden) in schools, as well as the content of specific rules that might
eventually govern the suitability (Eignung) of a teacher for the teach71. See id. paras. 50–51 (noting that the headscarf can have many meanings).
72. Court Hears Muslim Teacher’s Case for Head Scarf, June 6, 2003, http://www.germany.
info/relaunch/info/publications/week/2003/030606/politics4.html.
73. Kampf ums Kopftuch [Battle over Headscarf], September 23, 2003, http://www.zdf.de/
ZDFde/inhalt/26/0,1872,2068602,00.html.
74. Id.
75. Teacher Headscarf Case, para. 1 (ruling).
76. Id. para. 72 (opinion).
77. Id. para. 65.
78. Id.
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ing profession in this changed social environment, were not to be
taken by public school authorities themselves.79 Rather, the majority
stressed, such a decision could be taken only by the “democratically
legitimized [regional] legislator.”80
This majority opinion further opened the door for new regional
laws concerning the relationship between state neutrality and freedom of religion by declaring that future legislation concerning headscarves in public schools might be “a permissible restriction of [the]
freedom of faith” that conforms to Article 9 of the European Convention.81 Article 9, as discussed above, guarantees “the right to freedom
of thought, conscience, and religion,” but makes this right subject “to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of
public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.”82
These two cases give the reader a sense of the developing trend in
European jurisprudence I outlined earlier. The transformation in
German jurisprudence is particularly telling. The German Basic Law
of 1949, Article 4, protects freedom of religion without any reservations
or possibilities of restriction on this freedom.83 This strongly enforced constitutional protection of the individual from the power of the state
stems from Germany’s totalitarian history. As was noted by Jutta
Limbach, former president of the German Constitutional Court, “the
Weimar Republic collapsed . . . from deep-rooted authoritarian state
traditions. The Court’s case law may be seen as one fruit of this insight,”84 and the protection of religious freedom is no exception. This
long-established German approach contrasts sharply with the European Convention (as we saw in Şahin), which expressly states that
some limitations on freedom of religion may be necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, public order, health, or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

79. Id. para. 66.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION, app. A 232–33 (Brice Dickson ed.,
1997).
83. Oliver Gerstenberg, Germany: Freedom of Conscience in Public Schools, 3 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 94, 95 (2005).
84. Bundesverfassungegericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 1998, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerwGE] (F.R.G.) (unavailable in English).
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The 1995 Classroom Crucifix case85 marked the first shift in German jurisprudence toward an understanding of religious freedom
that is in greater harmony with the European Convention and the
jurisprudence of the ECHR. In that case, the Constitutional Court
initially held that crucifixes should be removed from all public elementary school classrooms (though the Court then backed down
from this position in the face of a public outcry and strong objections
from the state of Bavaria).86 Teacher Headscarf, as the first high-profile
case concerning religious freedom and public neutrality to reach the
Constitutional Court since that time, is of considerable significance.
The Court’s holding—in which it overturned the decision of the Baden-Württemberg board of education solely on the grounds that there
were no regulations in place that would allow for a ban on religious
symbols,87 and suggested the possibility of future restrictions on religious freedom according to Article 9(2) of the European Convention—implies a consolidation of the trend in jurisprudence that
began with Classroom Crucifix.
In their separate opinion, the three dissenting justices in Teacher
Headscarf went further than the majority in this jurisprudential direction, stressing that the individual rights of civil servants, in particular,
could be limited, and that public school teachers, as civil servants, do
not enjoy the same legal rights as school children and their parents—
precisely because teachers are organs of the state.88 These dissenting
justices observed that the majority position misjudged this special position of civil servants and their role in the formation of the democratic will.89
In the context of this dissent, it is helpful to contrast the official
positions—and to understand the implications thereof for public order—of Şahin, the applicant to the European Court of Human Rights,
versus Ludin, the applicant to the German Constitutional Court.
Şahin was a university student, a woman of legal age, who wished to
attend a state university with a headscarf.90 Although Ludin was also a
woman of legal age, she was applying to be a civil servant (a representative of the state) and wished to teach in the classroom while wearing
85. Bundesverfassungegericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 16, 1995,
93 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerwGE] 1 (F.R.G.) (unavailable in
English) [hereinafter Classroom Crucifix Case].
86. Id.
87. Teacher Headscarf Case, para. 72.
88. Id. para. 77.
89. Id. para. 76–79.
90. Şahin II, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 106.
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a headscarf.91 The difference has important implications for those
adjudicating the delicate line between religious freedom and state
neutrality; for although the decisions in both cases permitted prohibitions—either the maintenance of prohibitions on Islamic headscarves
for students in public universities, or the eventual creation of new
prohibitions on Islamic headscarves for teachers in state schools—the
dissenting opinion of the German justices in Teacher Headscarf draws
our attention to the critical question of the applicants’ different positions vis-à-vis the civil service, and the tensions between individual religious freedom and the neutrality of those employed by the state in
diverse societies. In Şahin, the majority opinion did not even acknowledge this critical difference in the applicant’s position—which the single dissenting judge criticized as a crucial failure.92
The different positions of these applicants, along with the implication that the official position of a woman vis-à-vis the state administration may affect the meaning and potential consequences of her
wearing of the Islamic headscarf, raise a core controversy that provokes debate in plural societies. For what was explicit, if not fully developed, in the majority and dissenting opinions in Teacher Headscarf,
as well as the majority opinion in Şahin, was the perceived political, and
potentially negative, meaning of the Islamic headscarf in a democratic
society. No longer simply considered a religious symbol, these decisions suggest that the Islamic headscarf is increasingly seen as a symbol of a clearly political nature, which increasingly is perceived to have,
in and of itself, negative implications for public order in a democratic
society. In neither Teacher Headscarf nor Şahin, however, did the majority demonstrate that the headscarf, in the specific contexts relative
to the applicants, presented a clear and present threat to public order,
or to the liberty of others. Moreover, neither the European Court of
Human Rights in Şahin nor the German Constitutional Court in
Teacher Headscarf presented any tangible argument or evidence that
the headscarves in general posed a threat to public order, to women’s
rights, or to their religious expression. The lack of evidence concerning such issues was specifically noted by the dissenting judge in Şahin,
who, in criticizing the majority’s views on the meaning of headscarves
in a secular and democratic society, stressed that not even the Turkish
government, in its defense, argued that Şahin used the headscarf in a
way that threatened public order, in an “ostentatious or aggressive”
manner, or to “exert pressure, to provoke a reaction, to proselytize or
91. Teacher Headscarf Case, para. 1.
92. Şahin II, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 141 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
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to spread propaganda.”93 This dissenting judge went on to raise a
fundamental point that is increasingly contested across Europe—
namely, that “[m]erely wearing the headscarf cannot be associated
with fundamentalism and it is vital to distinguish between those who
wear the headscarf and ‘extremists’ who seek to impose the headscarf
as they do other religious symbols.”94 The same judge asked, “[W]hat,
in fact, is the connection between the [ban on wearing headscarves]
and sexual equality? . . . As the German Constitutional Court noted in
[Teacher Headscarf], wearing the headscarf has no single meaning; it is
a practice that is engaged in for a variety of reasons.”95
Nowhere is the narrowness of the Grand Chamber’s outlook
more apparent than in its discussion of the headscarf and gender
equality.96 Although the majority in Şahin found that the ban on
wearing the headscarf was also a means of protecting gender equality,
the court’s analysis in this regard was notably thin and unsatisfying: in
addition to simply quoting the chamber opinion at length, the Grand
Chamber quoted its own language from Dahlab v. Switzerland (which
characterized the headscarf as a “powerful external symbol” that was
“imposed on women by a religious precept that was hard to reconcile
with the principle of gender equality”)97 and expressed the need to
protect citizens “from external pressure from extremist movements”
such as those that would “impose on society as a whole their religious
symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts.”98
But this kind of conclusory reasoning is simply inadequate to address
the fundamental questions here, especially in the context of the particular facts that arose in Şahin: To what extent is the wearing of the
Islamic headscarf a freely chosen individual act of religious freedom,
one that is to be guaranteed and protected, and to what extent might
it represent a religious coercion of individuals, and of women in particular, thereby threatening the protection of equality between men and
women and resulting in discrimination, and therefore, a threat to
public order, where public order is understood as the fundamental
value associated with the constitutional state?
In highlighting the German Constitutional Court’s understanding in Teacher Headscarf that there is no single, straightforward way of
understanding the practice of wearing a headscarf, the dissenting
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See
Id.
Id.

at 142.
at 143.
id. at 128–29 (majority opinion).
at 127.
at 127–28, 128–29.
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judge in Şahin highlighted the striking divergence in the two courts’
discussions concerning the nature, meaning, and consequences of the
Islamic headscarf—both in and of itself, and with regard to its implications for women’s rights and for equality between the sexes in a democratic society. It is, indeed, the vehement disagreement over the
nature, meaning, and implications of the headscarf that lies at the
heart of these cases, and that is therefore essential for understanding
and adjudicating the limits of religious freedom. And yet, in Teacher
Headscarf it was only the dissenting justices who addressed either the
controversial question of the symbolic nature of the Islamic headscarf
in relation to the equality of men and women, or the relationship between freedom of religion and the protection of other fundamental,
individual freedoms in a democratic society. And in Şahin, although
the Grand Chamber addressed these issues in somewhat greater depth
than was done in the earlier chamber judgment, the Grand Chamber’s analysis still did little to move past generalities and to engage the
actual facts and complexities of the case, with regard both to Şahin
herself and to the larger religious, social, and political phenomena
against which her protest needed to be understood.
Even from a strict, narrow legal perspective, the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Şahin can be faulted. As the dissenting judge argued, the majority had failed both to clarify the permitted legal
reasons for interfering with the applicant’s right to freedom of religion, and—unlike other European states where bans on religious attire
in pubic schools apply only to minors (who are considered more vulnerable to pressure)—to take into account that the applicant in this
case, Şahin, was of legal age. This dissenting judge also noted that in
“relying exclusively on the reasons cited by the national authorities
and courts” (and one might add, in following so closely the reasoning
of the chamber), the majority had merely sought to “weigh” the principles of secularism, equality, and liberty “against the other” rather
than attempting to harmonize them.99 And here the dissenting judge
argued that there was no evidence before the court to suggest that
Şahin had any intention of using her headscarf to exert pressure, provoke a reaction, proselytize, or spread propaganda.100 Moreover, the
judge noted that there was no suggestion or demonstration that there
was any disruption in teaching or any disorderly conduct associated
with the wearing of the headscarf.101 Therefore, the judge concluded
that the dual conditions that would justify imposing legal restrictions
99. Id. at 140 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 142.
101. Id.
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on religious freedom—protection of the rights of others and the
maintenance of public order—had not been satisfied in Şahin’s
case.102 With her religious freedom on one side of the equation,
there was, in effect, nothing on the other. There was, as it were, nothing against which Şahin’s religious freedom could be weighed or
balanced.
It is helpful to compare the dissenting judge’s opinion in Şahin to
the majority opinion of the United Nations Human Rights Committee
in Raihon Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan.103 In that case, the Committee
determined that Uzbekistan had violated Raihon’s rights under Article 18(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.104 Raihon, a twenty-two-year-old student at the Tashkent State
Institute for Eastern Languages, claimed that she had repeatedly been
denied access to the institute’s courses and residence for having refused to remove her headscarf (in this case, the word hijab was
used).105 The Committee noted that Article 18, paragraph 2, “prohibits any coercion that would impair the individual’s freedom to have or
adopt a religion,” and that Uzbekistan “has not invoked any specific
ground for which the restriction imposed on the author would in its
view be necessary in the meaning of article 18, paragraph 3” (to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the fundamental rights
and freedoms of others).106 In one of the three individual opinions
appended to that of the Committee, however, Ruth Wedgwood noted
the lack of clarity in the facts of the case; for example, the degree to
which the scarf actually covered the woman’s face, or whether it just
covered her neck and hair, was simply indeterminate.107 Wedgwood
juxtaposed her reasoning to that of the ECHR in Şahin, noting that
she found “problematic” the ECHR’s decision that, on the very general basis that “‘extremist political movements in Turkey’ sought ‘to
impose on society as a whole their religious symbols,’” Turkey could
interfere with the applicants’ right to religious expression.108 Wedgwood noted that a “state may be allowed to restrict forms of dress that
102. Id.
103. Raihon Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan, Judgments of U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 931/2000, UN Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000 (2005).
104. Id. paras. 6.2, 7. Article 18(2) provides: “No one shall be subject to coercion which
would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 18, Dec. 16, 1966, available at http://
www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm.
105. Raihon Hudoyberganova, Comm. No. 931/2000, paras. 2.2, 2.4.
106. Id. para. 6.2.
107. Id. para. 1 (Wedgwood, J., dissenting).
108. Id. paras. 3–4.
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directly interfere with effective pedagogy”; consequently, what was
needed in Raihon, and presumably in Şahin, was a more detailed discussion of the headscarf as a form of clothing that could interfere with
the daily classroom activities.109
A second major set of questions for twenty-first-century constitutionalism raised by Şahin and Teacher Headscarf concerns the appropriate allocation of decision-making authority for these divisive issues.
Who should decide how to interpret “public order”? Should there be
a pan-European interpretation of this critical, and historical, legal
concept? If so, who should decide what constitutes a threat to a European “public order”? Are local government authorities, or central and
international courts, in a more appropriate position to decide the issue? The questions raised illustrate the growing tensions more generally emanating from an internationalization of law, including “one of
the most cosmopolitan, and controversial, trends in constitutional law:
using foreign and international law as an aid to interpreting” domestic
constitutional law.110 In both cases discussed above we see the difficulties of establishing and maintaining, in the diverse member states of
the European Union, a “European jurisprudence of religious freedom” in line with that of Article 9(2) of the European Convention.111
That Article guarantees religious freedom but also establishes the possibility of legally restricting religious freedom in the name of protecting public order and the rights and fundamental freedoms of others.
Interestingly, the ECHR Court and the German Constitutional Court
both delegated the final authority concerning the legalization of religious symbols to the respective subunits of each “federation” (in the
case of the ECHR, to the member states, and in the case of the German Constitutional Court, to the states or länder). This delegation
allows for, in effect, and for better or for worse, a plurality of practices
across the respective subunits.
Rather than presenting or developing a “European” perspective
on this sensitive issue concerning the governmental control of such
matters as religious practices, the majority in the ECHR’s Grand
Chamber specifically declined to intervene in Şahin’s situation, which
would have required the court to assess “local needs and conditions.”112 In so doing, the Grand Chamber left intact two critical judg109. Id. para. 4 (emphasis added).
110. Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for Foreign Law Could
Change the Supreme Court, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42.
111. For the text of Article 9(2) of the European Convention, see HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION, supra note 82, app. A at 233.
112. Şahin II, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 130.
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ments of the Constitutional Court of Turkey, one on March 7, 1989,
and the other on April 9, 1991. In the 1989 judgment, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the Turkish Higher Education
Act (Law No. 2547) that specifically allowed for the wearing of a veil
or headscarf in institutions of higher education, when done out of
religious conviction.113 Citing the Preamble and Article 174 of the
Turkish Constitution, the court noted that this law “could not be reconciled with the principle of sexual equality implicit, inter alia, in republican and revolutionary values.”114 The Grand Chamber also
noted that the Constitutional Court of Turkey, in its 1989 decision,
stressed that freedom of religion was not equivalent to the right to
wear religious attire; instead, first and foremost, freedom of religion
meant the liberty to decide whether to follow a particular religion.115
The Grand Chamber noted that in this important sense, the Constitutional Court of Turkey made clear that when the wearing of an Islamic
headscarf is imposed on individuals, it is incompatible with the values
of a democratic society, especially the values of secularism and the
religious neutrality of the state.116 The Grand Chamber noted, however, that in October 1990, transitional section 17 of Law No. 2547
came into force in Turkey, providing that “[c]hoice of dress shall be
free in institutions of higher education, provided that it does not contravene the laws in force.”117 But did that imply that university students were entitled to wear any clothing that they chose, thus
superseding the holding of the 1989 case? This question, as the
Grand Chamber observed, was decided in the April 1991 case: the
Turkish Constitutional Court found the Constitution still prohibited
the wearing of headscarves (as decided in the 1989 case), with the
consequence that section 17 could not be interpreted as authorizing
students to wear headscarves.118
In challenging the majority’s delegation of decision-making authority to the member states, the dissenting judge in Şahin called into
question the “margin of appreciation” approach used by the majority
to justify their conclusion that “the university authorities are in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local
needs.”119 This judge asked: who is best placed to decide how member
states should “discharge their Convention obligations in what is a sen113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 111.
at 112.

at 113.
at 139–40 (Tulkens, J., dissenting); id. at 130 (majority opinion).
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sitive area[?]”120 In responding, the judge presented two criticisms of
the majority’s analysis, specifically with regard to its argument that a
wide margin of appreciation was required because of “the diversity of
practice between the states on the issue of regulating the wearing of
religious symbols in educational institutions[,]” with the implication
that “a European consensus [was lacking] in this sphere.”121 First, the
dissenting judge noted that none of the other member states had bans
in place on religious attire at the university level; the diversity of state
practice underlying the majority position simply did not exist.122 Second, even if the majority chose to deal with these issues through a
margin of appreciation, the court was ignoring its obligation to provide the necessary “European supervision” on such matters; “the issue
raised in the application . . . , is not merely a ‘local’ issue, but one of
importance to all the Member States. European supervision cannot,
therefore, be escaped simply by invoking the margin of
appreciation.”123
Taken in their entirety, the majority and dissenting opinions in
Şahin and Teacher Headscarf alert us to the problem of slippage in
those liberal constitutional democracies that are asked to balance religious freedom and state neutrality in an increasingly diverse and socially explosive world. Several countries in Europe have begun
looking to Turkey and Germany for models of secularism that they
hope will limit, rather than exacerbate, social conflict. Notwithstanding important differences in the jurisprudence of Şahin and Teacher
Headscarf, the reasoning in both judgments seems to point in the direction of a structural transformation, by way of law, of public spheres
in Europe. This jurisprudential trend seems to constitute a return to
an “originalist” position on the definition and interpretation of public
order.124 Invoking this interpretation, courts privilege strong interpretations of neutrality over religious free expression, resulting in a
politics of hierarchical rights and a reordering of peoples within their
societies. See Figure II.

120. Id. at 139 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 140.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. By “originalism,” I mean here a specific version of the complex concept that is
usually understood and applied in the context of American jurisprudence. In my account,
however, and adapting Keith E. Whittington’s definition, originalism regards the discoverable meaning of the principles or values underlying the text “at the time of its initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the present.” Keith E.
Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2004).
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So while Rawls viewed a thick veil of ignorance as necessary for
the maintenance of a constitutional democratic society amid reasonable pluralism, he saw a gradual lifting of this veil through four sequential stages, culminating in a fully-lifted adjudication phase. In
contrast, recent legal efforts across Europe have demonstrated a will
to build anew a thick veil via prohibition, and to maintain it through
constitutional convention, legislation and adjudication phases of EU’s
development. What I am suggesting here and arguing more systematically in the larger project from which this Essay is drawn, is that forced
veiling of the original position is producing, paradoxically, slippage
from liberal constitutional democracy across the European continent.
Jurisprudence in this last Rawlsian phase, with its return to what I am
calling an originalist employment of the legal concept of public order,
must then be seen as the culmination of an attempt by European
states to carve a thickly veiled original position as a starting point for
the (stalled) European constitutional project, as a new attempt, by way
of prohibition, at a European Constitution of Peoples. But by so doing, and as Sandel observed for another democratic federation nearly
two decades ago, it seems clear that “this version of liberalism fails to
secure the toleration it promises.”125
125. Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in ARTICLES
ARTICLES OF PEACE 92 (James Davison Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990).
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